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Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)(j), which gives this Court jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction";
and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3, which generally does not give the Court of Appeals original
appellate jurisdiction over civil matters originating in the district court which are neither
administrative nor domestic. On September 7, 1995 the Utah Supreme Court ordered this
appeal poured-over to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Issue Presented on Cross-Appeal - Right to Attorney Fees
Where both the original and third party actions are dismissed with prejudice as to
all counts and attorneys fees are awarded to both prevailing parties pursuant to contract,
are the third party defendants entitled, as a matter of right, to their costs and reasonable
attorneys fees incurred in defending the action to be awarded against the third party
plaintiffs whose action was dismissed?

Third-party Defendants and Appellees/Cross-

Appellants Kee Hong Um and Shi Ja Um (hereinafter the "Urns") seek on appeal an order
entitling them to an award of judgment against third-party Plaintiffs/Defendants and
Appellees/Cross-Appellees Hasin Oh and Hyung Ja Oh (hereinafter the "Ohs") and
Plaintiffs and Appellants Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda (hereinafter the
"Satsudas"), jointly and severally.
Although the captioning of the briefs submitted by the other parties in this matter
indicate otherwise, the Urns are not appealing their judgment against the Satsudas, who are
not cross-appellees of this appeal. The Urns are seeking judgment against the Ohs jointly
and severally with the Satsudas. To the extent that they are successful as appellees and
cross-appellants, the Urns are also seeking their costs and reasonable attorneys fees, as a
1

judgment against the Satsudas and the Ohs jointly and severally, incurred for prosecuting
this cross-appeal and defending against the Satsudas' appealStandard of Review: Regarding the judgment of the Trial Court, the Ums are not
challenging its factual Findings, but the application of them to the law in the Conclusions
of Law. While findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous,
conclusions of law are simply reviewed for correctness without any special deference,
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P2d 1376 (Utah
1987).
Citation to the Record Showing Issue Preserved: Ums' Objection to Defendants'
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order of Dismissal and Judgment,
and Request for Clarification of Minute Entry, all five pages.
Issues Presented on Appeal - Objection
The Ums object to the Satsudas' statement of issues presented on appeal for failing
to appropriately refer to the record of the case to show where each issue was preserved for
appeal, or a statement of grounds for seeking review of any issue not preserved in the trial
court, as is required by Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(5). The failure of the Satsudas to establish
grounds for review of each issue is all the more egregious for the fact that 16 issues are
stated in Appellants' Brief pp. 4-7 (issue no. 12 repeated twice), while only 14 issues are
raised in their docketing statement. Issue 15 is newly raised in their brief, attacking an
earlier partial summary judgment issue which was subsequently tried, although not
specifically ruled upon.
The Ums were not defendants in the Satsudas' complaint. The Ohs have declined
to appeal the dismissal, with prejudice, of their third-party action against the Ums; and they
have declined to appeal any other finding of fact or conclusion of law of the Trial Court.
2

Accordingly, even if the Satsudas successfully prevail on all issues raised on appeal, the Urns
may no longer be found liable to either the Ohs or the Satsudas.

Under these

circumstances, the Urns are appellees only as to the Satsudas' appeal of the Urns' judgment
for attorney fees, being issues 9, 10, and 14. Only these issues, dealing with the Urns' right
to attorney's fees and the Satsudas' indirect liability for them will be briefed by the Ums.
Determinative Statutes and Rules
Relevant to where a successful defense establishes no default under a contract and
still seeks prevailing party attorney fees is Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5, which provides:
Attorney's fees - Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or
other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to
recover attorney's fees.
Relevant to the Satsudas' failure to establish that each issue raised was preserved for
appeal, Utah R.App.P. 24(j) provides:
Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the
offending lawyer.
Statement of the Case
A. Nature of the case: In 1990, the Satsudas, as buyers, brought an action against
the Ohs, as sellers, after suffering an adverse building inspection of a motel which had been
purchased about a month earlier (Hereinafter the "Property"). The Ohs filed a third party
action against the Ums, who had sold them the Property over three years earlier, and who
had undertaken the complained of changes in the Property.
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B. Course of proceedings: On March 15, 1990 the Satsudas filed their action against
the Ohs for breach of their Earnest Money Agreement with them (herein after the
"Satsudas Earnest Money"), loss of value, special and general damages, and attorneys fees.
The Ohs filed against the Urns on July 5, 1991, were dismissed, and filed again on April 19,
1993, having alleged six causes against the Urns based upon their Earnest Money Agreement
with Urns (hereinafter the "Ohs Earnest Money") and similar to those claimed by the
Satsudas, plus a right to indemnification. On May 2, 1995 the original order of dismissal
of Satsudas' complaint and judgment of the Ohs' attorney's fees against them was signed
and entered. On May 12, 1995 the Urns filed their motion, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, to open, alter, or amend the previous order and judgment. On
June 9, 1995 the first amended order of dismissal of the Satsuda's complaint and judgment
of costs attorney's fees against the Satsudas for the Ohs and Urns was signed and entered.
On July 9, 1995 the supplemental order of judgment appealed from was signed and entered,
disposing of the Urns' Rule 59 motion and setting the amount of the Urns' attorneys fees
to be awarded against the Satsudas, but not allowing the Urns any judgment for costs and
fees against the Ohs. The Satsudas filed notices of appeal on June 5, July 10, and July 27,
1995. On August 1, 1995 the Urns' notice of appeal was filed.
C. Disposition in the trial court: After the matter was tried to the bench over two
days, all causes of action raised under both the complaint and the third party action were
dismissed. The Ohs were awarded their prevailing party attorney's fees, in the sum of
$44,959.86, against the Satsudas pursuant to contract, as were the Urns awarded their
attorney's fees and costs, in the sum of $56,126.77, directly against the Satsudas as a cost
of the Ohs. However, the Urns were not awarded a joint and several judgment sought
against both the Ohs and the Satsudas.
4

D. Statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review:
1. On February 28, 1987, the Ums executed the Ohs Earnest Money with the Ohs
for the sale of "a 40 unit motel called capitol motel" located at 1749 So. State St, Salt Lake
City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the Property) for the sum of $550,000.00 (Statement
of Stipulated Facts 1120, Brief of Appellant, Addendum no. 3).
2. The Ums sold the Property to the Ohs on May 1, 1987 for $540,000.00 through
execution of a Uniform Real Estate Contract (hereinafter the "Contract"). At that time, the
Property consisted of 39 units. (116, First Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Brief of Appellant, Addendum no. 12, hereinafter "Findings").
3. Paragraph 18 of the Contract provides: "With respect to the physical condition
of the Property, Seller warrants the following: Buyer has inspected the subject premises and
accepts the subject property 'as is'" (Brief of Appellees, Addendum no. 2).
4. On November 16, 1989, the Satsudas had executed the Satsudas Earnest Money
to purchase the Property as a 40-unit motel for some $620,000.00 (1119, Findings).
5. The sale of the Property to the Satsudas by the Ohs closed on January 5, 1990
by execution of closing documents, which included an assignment to the Satsudas of the
Contract (Hereinafter the "Assignment") (H20, Findings).
6. On February 12, 1990, the Satsudas were advised of the zoning and building code
deficiencies disclosed by the Lawrence Suggars inspection of the Property in January, 1990
(1121, Findings).
7. The Satsudas obtained a zoning variance for the Property's parking lot at a cost
of approximately $2,500.00 in attorney's fees (f22, Findings).
8. The Satsudas remodeled deficient rental units on the Property to comply with
applicable Salt Lake City codes except for unit 35 which was permanently closed. The
5

Satsudas completely closed certain other rental units during remodeling, an action which
was not required by Salt Lake City (H23, Findings).
9. The Satsudas sold the Property on January 5, 1994, during the pendency of this
matter for some $860,000.00, $240,000.00 more than their purchase price (1124, Findings).
10. With the dismissal of the Ohs' action against them with prejudice, the Ums have
prevailed against Ohs.

(Ifl, Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Regarding Assessment of Third Party Defendants' Attorneys' Fees Against Plaintiffs, Brief
of Appellant, Addendum no. 18, hereinafter "Supplemental Findings").
11. The Contract entered into by the Ums as Sellers and the Ohs as Buyers, and
later assumed by the Satsudas, provides in 1115 that "the prevailing party in litigation, shall
be entitled to all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee" for pursuing any
remedy provided by the Contract "or by applicable law." (1f2, Supplemental Findings).
12. Paragraph 3b of the Assignment obligates the Satsudas, as assignees, to hold
harmless the Ohs, as assignors, from "any and all actions, suits, costs, damages, claims and
demands whatsoever arising by reason of an act or omission of the assignees." (114,
Supplemental Findings).
13. Based upon the undisputed and uncontroverted evidence on record before the
Court, as of February 17, 1995, the Ums incurred necessary and reasonable costs and
attorneys fees in the sum of fifty-six thousand one hundred twenty-six dollars and seventyseven cents ($56,126.77) (1111, Supplemental Findings).
14. The Satsudas claimed in their complaint, at Ml 39 & 40, that the Satsudas
Earnest Money obligated the Ohs, as the defaulting party, to pay the Satsudas' reasonable
attorney's fees, plus all costs and expenses (pg. 7, Brief of Appellant, Addendum no. 1).

6

15. The Ohs claimed in their third party complaint, at WI 28 & 29, that the Oh
Earnest Money obligated the Urns, as the defaulting party, to pay all the Ohs' costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees (pg. 5, Brief of Appellant, Addendum no. 2).
16. Regarding attorney's fees, 1FB of the Ohs Earnest Money (Brief of Appellant,
Addendum no. 21), and KN of the Satsudas Earnest Money (Brief of Appellant, Addendum
no. 24) both provide:
Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the
covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or
accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is
pursued by filing suit or otherwise.
17. The Satsudas' complaint makes no reference to, or even an acknowledgment of,
the existence of the Contract or the Assignment (Complaint, Brief of Appellant, Addendum
no. 1).
18. The Oh's third-party complaint attaches the Contract as Exhibit B and refers to
the Contract's existence only once, in 14, alleging that the Ohs purchased the Property from
the Urns on February 28, 1987, the date of the execution of the Ohs Earnest Money
(Complaint, Brief of Appellant, Addendum no. 2).
19.

Both the Ohs and the Satsudas relied upon a breach of the representations

contained within their respective earnest money agreements to establish their causes of
action, claiming a breach of Seller's warranties under HC (1112, Complaint, Brief of
Appellant, Addendum no. 1; 1f7, Complaint, Brief of Appellant, Addendum no. 2).
20.

Additionally, the Ohs claimed damages for breach of contract for the

misrepresentation that the Property sold under the Oh Earnest Money was described as "a
40 unit motel called Capitol Motel", when a number of rooms had been added without a
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building permit (115, Complaint, Brief of Appellant, Addendum no. 2).
Summary of Arguments
1. The Urns' defense to the Oh's complaint was to raise the terms of the Contract
as a bar to the Oh's reliance upon the preceding Oh Earnest Money. As such, the Urns'
attorney's fees were incurred in enforcing the Contract. The Ohs prepared and filed the
Findings, and raised no objection to the Supplemental Findings.
2. The Urns and Ohs are entitled to their judgments for attorneys fees against the
Satsudas under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5, which statutorily varies the meaning of all
contracts executed after April 28, 1986 to allow prevailing party attorney fees where any
party to the contract which is the basis for the litigation could have recovered their fees
under that contract.
3. In contrast to the attorney's fees language reviewed in Maynard v. Wharton, 912
P2d 446, 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1996), and contained in the earnest monies,
the Contract between the parties provides for prevailing party costs and attorney's fees.
4. As a party that was awarded their attorneys fees at trial, the Urns are entitled to
an award of their attorneys fees on appeal.
Arguments
1. Urns' Third Party Defense Enforced Contract
The Contract is significantly different from either the Oh or Satsuda Earnest Monies:
It omits many of the representations and warranties contained within the earlier agreements;
it identifies the Property only by its street address and its metes and bounds, rather than as
a 40 unit motel; and it eliminates all warranties of physical condition, specifying in U18 that
the Property, after inspection by the buyer having been exercised, is being accepted "as is".
The Urns paid for these concessions, reducing the purchase price by $10,000. Further, the
8

Contract has two attorney's fees provisions, at 1JH 15 and 16, with II16, addressing Buyer's
Default, containing three separate references to Seller's right to attorney's fees.
The Contract's provisions severely hampered Buyers' claims of breach of warranty
and misrepresentation. Further, under the doctrine of merger, any recognition of the
binding validity of the Contract would extinguish all terms of the earnest monies, preventing
any election of remedies or reliance upon terms and warranties of the earlier agreements.
The acknowledgement and enforcement of the terms of the Contract so eviscerated the
Satsudas' complaint, that, even now, on appeal, they couldn't bring themselves to attach it
or the Assignment as one of the 24 addendums to their brief, although both earnest money
agreements are included.
The Trial Court enforced the Contract, invoked the doctrine of merger, and
extinguished the earnest monies. Addressing the collateral rights doctrine, the Trial Court
concluded that none of the warranties survived the earnest monies. With the dismissal of
both complaints, The Trial Court specifically found that the Ums had prevailed over the
Ohs in this litigation (HI, Supplemental Findings).
Having prevailed, the Trial Court concluded that: "Pursuant to paragraph 15 of the
uniform real estate contract, [the Ums] are entitled to an award against [the Ohs] of all
their costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defending this action" (Supplemental
Findings, 112 of Conclusions of Law). The Trial Court did not view the Ums' entitlement
to an "award" as entitling the Ums to judgment against the Ohs. However, under the
Assignment, the Trial Court found that the Ums' "award" entitled them to judgment against
the Satsudas (Supplemental Findings, 1f1f 3 and 4 of Conclusions of Law).
The Ohs neither raised nor filed any objection to the Supplemental Findings, leaving
the Satsudas and Ums to raise, and counter, relevant objections. The Ohs have filed no
9

appeal of any part of the judgements or findings. "As a general rule, appellate courts will
not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances."
State v. Brown, 856 P2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah Supreme Court, in
Gill v. Timm, 720 P2d 1352, 31 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah 1986) held that this requirement
applies to all parties:
A party objecting to the trial court's ruling must make a clear and succinct
objection to the court at the time the error first becomes apparent. The court
must be afforded a timely opportunity to correct its error, or the objecting
party will have waived its right to argue the objection on appeal. Beehive
Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Co., Utah, 669 P2d 859, 861 (1983). This
is so whether the error runs to jury instructions, as to which objections are
governed by Rule 51, see, e.g., Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., Utah,
704 P2d 573, 579 (1985), or whether the error involves a question of law or
procedure in a bench trial. See, e.g., Callan v. Biermann, 194 Kan. 219, 398
P2d 355, 357 (1965).
While the Ohs certainly objected to the award of any judgment directly against them, upon
which they prevailed, they have not contested the facts and law underlying that decision,
and, upon the authority cited, they may not do so now.
The Trial Court's award of the Urns' fees against the Ohs compels that judgment be
entered against the Ohs for the Urns, as it has already been against the Satsudas.

"The

party in whose favor the 'net' judgment is entered must be considered the 'prevailing party'
and is entitled to an award of its fees," Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P2d
551, 556 (Utah App. 1989). In Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P2d
217, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 (Utah App. 1990), this Court analyzed the prevailing party's
right to a judgment for those fees as follows:
Where there was a right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the
party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the
fees attributable to those claims on which the party was successful. See
[Mountain States Broadcasting] at 566 n.10 (reasonable fee excludes amounts
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attributable to issues or claims on which party otherwise entitled to fee was
unsuccessful); Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P2d 1080,1085 (Utah App. 1988)
(defendant was entitled to attorney fees for the counterclaims on which he
was successful as well as for his successful defense of plaintiffs attempt to
accelerate a promissory note), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); see
also Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P2d
1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of attorney fees was remanded for a
determination of only those fees attributable to the pursuit of successful
claims).
Other Cases determinative of this issue are: Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P2d 622, 623
(Utah 1985): "Furthermore, contrary to appellant's contention that attorneys fees should
be determined on the basis of an equitable standard, attorneys fees, when awarded as
allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of legal right" Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P2d 574,579
(Utah App. 1991): "Where the terms of a contract provide for the award of attorney fees,
such fees are 'awarded as a matter of legal right.' [citations omitted]. If reasonable fees
are recoverable by statute or contract, it is a mistake of law to award less than that amount.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d 985, 990-91 (Utah 1988)."
Having successfully raised the Contract and its provisions in defense against the Ohs'
and Satsudas' claims, resulting in a complete nonsuit, the Urns are entitled, pursuant to the
terms of that Contract, to an award of judgment for their attorney's fees against both
parties, jointly and severally.
2. Prevailing Party Attorney Fees Allowed Under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5
If there is no default or breach of the terms of the Contract, which is the result of
the dismissal of both complaints, may the Urns and the Ohs, as prevailing parties, still
recover their costs and attorney's fees? Recently, in Maynard, the Utah Court of Appeals
interpreted an attorney's fees provision of a standard Utah earnest money agreement as not
providing for prevailing party attorney's fees for the successful defense of a breach of
contract action when the other party's default under the contract cannot be established. It
11

reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees to the prevailing defendant sellers.
Here, neither the Satsudas nor the Ohs have failed to make timely payments under
the Contract. For the purposes of this appeal it can also be assumed that the property taxes
have been paid, insurance maintained, and the property cared for and maintained. No
notice of default under the Contract has been conveyed to the Satsudas by the Ohs or to
the Ohs by the Urns. The dismissal of the complaints represented the Trial Court's
conclusion that no party had engaged in any default, breach, or tort concerning the other
in regard to the Property.
Maynard was decided wrongly. First the Court of Appeals had just determined that
the earnest money agreement containing the relevant attorney's fees provision was
"extinguished and unenforceable," quoting Stubbs v Hemmert, 567 P2d 168,169 (Utah 1977),
Maynard, at 449, 450. The Court then went on the discuss why, under the facts of the case,
none of the exceptions to the merger doctrine applied to any of the clauses contained within
the earnest money agreement. The opinion concludes with a detailed analysis of why a nondefaulting defendant cannot recover attorney's fees under the earnest money agreement's
attorney fee provision.
Rather than state that one cannot recover attorney fees under an extinguished and
unenforceable provision of an extinguished and unenforceable agreement, the Utah Court
of Appeals ruled that, under the express terms of the provision regarding attorney's fees,
only defaulting parties could be held liable. With that decision, any successful defense to
an action under an earnest money agreement is denied any contractual recovery of attorney
fees. "Paragraph 'N' has limits; it does not award attorney fees to prevailing parties in every
suit related to the earnest money agreement. In short, paragraph 'N' does not contemplate
an award of attorney fees for sellers just because buyers sued." Maynard, at 452.
12

Whether or not 1fN of the earnest money contemplates attorney fees "for sellers just
because buyers sued", Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 provides for such fees:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after
April 28,1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing
allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
First, the allowance of costs and attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, since it is permissive only. But the discretion granted is broad, allowing
prevailing party attorney fees where the action is based upon any promissory note, written
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986. All that is required is that the
attorney's fees provision within the agreement would have allowed at least one of the parties
to have recovered their attorney fees. But the statute does not require that the cause of
action would have allowed recovery of attorney's fees by either party under the agreement's
attorney's fee provision; it only requires that the action be "based upon" the agreement
containing the attorney's fees provision.
But for the existence of the Contract, by which they acquired the property
complained of, neither the Ohs nor the Satsudas would have had a cause of action against
the Urns. Clearly then, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 supports the Trial Court's discretion
in awarding the Urns and the Ohs their costs and attorney's fees against the Satsudas.
When Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 was raised on an appeal of the denial of
attorney's fees to a prevailing party in Schapr v. Harrigan, 879 P2d 1384, 245 Utah Adv.
Rep. 15 (Utah App. 1994), this Court supported the trial court's discretion:
The Harrigans cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of their
motion for attorney fees. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement provided for
payment of reasonable attorney fees to the non-defaulting party. Using this
provision as a springboard, the Harrigans requested attorney fees under Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 (1992).
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In Utah, the "calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a
showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d
985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). In this case, the trial court denied the
Harrigans' motion for attorney fees because only one of the Schafirs' claims
stemmed from the contract and "any fees or costs uniquely applicable to the
[contractual] warranty claim are insignificant." Although the trial court could
have attempted to allocate a portion of the fees to the contractual warranty
claim, it decided against such action because "it would not be appropriate."
We believe that the trial court is in the best position to determine how much
of the attorney's time was spent on each of the four issues. In addition, we
think that the trial court should determine whether an allocation of fees is
appropriate under the circumstances. In this case, the trial court felt it was
inappropriate and we defer to its decision because there is no clear abuse of
discretion. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Harrigans'
motion to award attorney fees.
Although Schafir was cited twice in Maynard as part of that case's analysis of the
doctrine of merger, Schafir's review of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 was completely ignored.
Under Schafir, the Trial Court's exercise of its sound discretion to award the Urns and the
Ohs all of their costs and attorney's fees should not be disturbed absent a showing of a clear
abuse of discretion. Further, with the Ohs and the Satsudas having raised their actions and
having claimed attorney's fees under their earnest money agreements, whether or not those
agreements and provisions are extinguished, this Court can use Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5
to support the Trial Court's decision to award costs and attorney fees.
3. By Contract, if Litigation Concerns Property,
Prevailing Party to be Awarded Attorney Fees
The Contract's provision allowing prevailing party attorney's fee states at 115:
Both parties agree that,
[first alternative]
should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein
contained, the non-defaulting party
or,
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[second alternative]
should litigation be commenced, the prevailing party in litigation,
[result]
shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's
fee, which may arise or accrue from
[nature of action or litigation allowed]
[1] enforcing or terminating this contract, or
[2] in obtaining possession of the Property, or
[3] in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or
[4] by applicable law.

(structure, emphasis, and bracketed language added)

Under this provision any litigation between the parties regarding the Property entitles
the prevailing party to an award of attorney's fees and costs, regardless of whether the
action arose from a contractual default. In contrast to the agreement language reviewed
mMaynard, which applied only to the "defaulting party", id. at 451, H15 establishes the rights
of "non-defaulting" and "prevailing" parties. Further, 1115 does not require a default in the
terms of the Contract in order to qualify for prevailing party attorneys fees; it only requires
that the parties to the Contract be engaged in litigation concerning the Contract's subjectmatter property.
The Contract has three other provisions allowing attorneys fees in the event of
buyer's default, under 1116, at subsections A, B, and C. 1115 was drafted more broadly, to
cover any dispute between the parties concerning the subject-matter of the Contract. Under
1115 of the Contract, the Ums are entitled to an award of judgment against the Ohs and the
Satsudas, since the Ums are the prevailing party, the remedies sought by the Ohs and the
Satsudas were legal, and the litigation concerned the Contract Property.
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4. Prevailing Party Attorney Fees Allowed on Appeal
Where a party has been awarded attorney fees at the trial level, the Utah Supreme
Court has recognized an equal entitlement to an award of attorney fees on appeal, in
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P2d 890 (Utah 1996), it recently affirmed a right to statutory
attorney fees for a successful appeal, stating:
Analogously, we have recognized that a contractual obligation to pay
attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should also include fees
incurred on appeal. In Management Services v. Development Associates, 617
P2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980), we stated that the purpose of an attorney fees
provision is to indemnify the prevailing party against the necessity of paying
attorney fees and thereby enable him to recover the full amount of the
obligation. Id. at 409. In accordance with this purpose, we concluded that "a
provision for payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is
brought to enforce the contract." Id. Similarly, the court of appeals recently
ruled that the prevailing party in a dispute over a contractual attorney fees
provision was entitled, not only to attorney fees on appeal, but also to the
fees it incurred establishing the reasonableness of the fees for which it was
entitled to be indemnified. James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P2d 665,
674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Here, the Ums are on appeal to seek the "award" of their attorney fees reduced to
judgment against the Ohs. As Appellees, the Ums seek to both justify the dismissal of the
Satsudas' action by the Trial Court, and, by so prevailing, support the Trial Court's award
of their attorney fees against the Satsudas. Under the case law cited, the Ums are entitled
to an award of their attorney fees on appeal, should they prevail.
Conclusion
The Satsudas have failed to marshall the evidence to overcome the findings of the
Trial Court and have failed to show how their issues were preserved for appeal.
Accordingly, based upon the uncontroverted findings of the Trial Court, this Court should
affirm the Trial Court's order of dismissal of the complaint and its award of prevailing party
attorney fees to the Ohs and Ums.
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The Urns have demonstrated to the Court that the Trial Court's decision to award
them all their attorney fees is supported by the terms of the Contract as a prevailing party
and as a party to the Contract who sought to enforce it as a defense against the actions
brought by the Ohs and Satsudas. However, the Trial Court abused its discretion in not
giving the Urns judgment against the Ohs for their attorney fees after making an "award"
of these fees against the Ohs. If this Court reverses the Trial Court on this issue and
awards the Urns judgment against the Ohs and the Satsudas, jointly and severally, then the
judgement against the Ohs should be treated as a "cost", enhancing the judgment of the Ohs
against the Satsudas by a like amount
If the Contract's clause on attorney fees is not found to be sufficient, then the Trial
Court's discretion in awarding judgment for costs and attorney fees to the Urns and the Ohs
against the Satsudas can be supported statutorily, under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5.
Further, and under that statute, the attorney fees provisions of the Ohs' and Satsudas'
earnest money agreements can be relied upon to justify an award of prevailing party
attorney fees, even though the agreements and clauses are extinguished.
Lastly, having prevailed below, the Urns seek an award of their attorney fees on
appeal against the Ohs and the Satsudas, jointly and severally.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of October, 1996.

Stephen R. SmitefJr.
Attorney for Appellees/Cross-Appellants
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